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UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE IN
MASSACHUSETTS: SETTING THE STANDARD
FOR NATIONAL REFORM
Mary Ann Chirba-Martin*& Andrds Torres**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Health care reform in the United States has proven to be one of
the most complex challenges facing lawmakers and private citizens
today. Although there is widespread agreement that the system is
in disarray and in dire need of fundamental reform, the core
problems of affordability and access continue to steadily worsen.
The extent of the national health care crisis is reflected in the fact

that although health care annually consumes some sixteen percent

of the nation's GDP (or $2.0 trillion),1 46.5 million Americans

under the age of sixty-five are currently uninsured. 2 Notwithstanding the astronomical resources devoted to health care, the number
of uninsured nationwide is expected to rise if skyrocketing costs
and other barriers to access are not systematically addressed. Despite this national crisis, the country's political and economic leadership continues to debate while avoiding any real action.
Compounding the lack of political consensus and will is the specter
of record budget deficits as a considerable road block to systemic
reform.
Facing this dearth of national leadership, a growing number of
states, including Vermont, Wisconsin, and California, are undertak* Associate Professor of Legal Reasoning, Research, and Writing, Boston College Law School; Boston College Law School, J.D.; Harvard School of Public Health,
M.P.H.
** Boston College Law School, J.D.
1. Aaron Catlin et al., National Health Spending in 2005: The Slowdown Continues, 26 HEALTH AFF. 142 (2007).

2.

KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAM-

ILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED:

A PRIMER 1 (2007).

3. In the 1990s, the "managed competition" model, which seeks to lower costs
and increase access, became a central strategy to health care reform in the United
States. See generally Alain E. Enthoven, The History and Principlesof Managed Competition, 12 HEALTH AFF. (SUPPLEMENT) 24 (1993). The Clinton Administration at-

tempted to apply these principles to national health care reform via the Health
Security Act, but Congress voted down the Act in 1994. See Jonathan Oberlander,
Learning from Failure in Healthcare Reform, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1677, 1677-79
(2007). Having learned from that experience, the Massachusetts plan applies a refined managed competition model at the state level.
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ing health care reform at the state level. Of all the state reforms,
none has received more attention than Massachusetts' newly enacted health care reform law. This landmark legislation entitled,
An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable
Health Care (the "Act"), was passed on April 12, 2006. 4 Having
taken effect on July 1, 2007, it is to date the boldest plan for achieving universal coverage, especially with its aggressive timetable of
being fully implemented in just three years.5
The plan has garnered much attention for its innovative design,
but is equally noteworthy for the political process behind the plan's
adoption and implementation. In early 2006, a broad-based coalition of over eighty private and public interest groups teamed with a
Democratic state legislature and a Republican governor to enact
the most comprehensive state health care reform bill in the nation.6
That such a disparate group of supporters agreed to any state-wide
health care reform proposal is remarkable. Even more impressive,
however, is that such depth and breadth of support have coalesced
for a plan that is largely untested. Given the profound importance
of achieving universal coverage and the political and financial
stakes involved, all eyes are on Massachusetts. The nation waits to
see what lessons will unfold from a plan which may or may not be
practically feasible and economically sustainable. No one, however, is watching more intently than the people of Massachusetts,
whose lives may hang in the balance.
The new law seeks to provide universal health care coverage to
all residents of the Commonwealth.7 Its key provisions mandate
coverage, emphasize personal responsibility, and create incentives
for employers, particularly small businesses, to provide insurance.
It also reorganizes the insurance market to foster competition and
choice, and expands subsidized assistance without raising taxes.'
This Article examines the plan's strategy for achieving its fundamental objective of providing all residents with universal access to
affordable, quality, and accountable health care. Part II begins by
describing the health care challenges that have confronted Massachusetts given the Commonwealth's fiscal and political climate as
well as its demographic make-up. It then analyzes the plan's pri4. 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58.
5. Id.

6. See CELIA WCISLO ET AL., 1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS E.,
LEssoNs LEARNED TO DATE FROM MASSACHUSETTs HEALTHCARE REFORM 10-11
(Aug. 2007).
7. See generally 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58.
8. See id. §§ 1-2A.
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mary components, paying particular attention to the costs and benefits of expanding Medicaid coverage, the use of health care
mandates, and the newly-created Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Board (the so-called "Connector"). The extent to
which the Massachusetts Health Care Plan can achieve its goals is
discussed in Part III, especially in light of what has proved to be
the bane of even incremental state reform for too many years: ERISA preemption of state law.
II.

HEALTH CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS
THE ROAD

To

AND

REFORM

A.

Background: A State of Challenges and Opportunities
Massachusetts faces many of the same challenges and deficiencies that trouble every state in the nation in terms of financing and
delivering health care. According to the Commonwealth, some
550,000 Massachusetts residents lacked health care coverage prior
to reform.9 Without decisive action, that number was sure to rise
since premium costs would continue to increase at double-digit
rates and increasing costs would incite more small and mediumsized businesses to drop employee health benefits.10 Declining employer coverage, coupled with over a half-million uninsured residents was clearly detrimental to the families and individuals
directly affected. In Massachusetts, it also imposed a significant
strain on state finances, businesses, and working families who inevitably funded the Commonwealth's $1 billion per-year Free Care
Pool that reimbursed hospitals for providing uncompensated
care.

11

Despite the significant challenges facing the Commonwealth, it
was in a stronger position than most states to enact broad reform.
9.

COMMONWEALTH

AFFORDABILITY REPORT,

OF MA. CONFERENCE COMM., HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND

Mass. Leg., 184th Sess., at 6 (2006), [hereinafter

CARE ACCESS AND AFFORDABILITY REPORT]

HEALTH

available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/

summary.pdf (discussing "a bridge between principles in the House and Senate bills,
H 4479 and S 2282). See also KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Key Facts: Massachusetts Healthcare Reform Plan 1
(Apr. 2006), [hereinafter KAISER COMM'N, KEY FACTS] available at http://www.all

health.org/briefingmaterials/Kaiser-MAHealthCareReformPlan-239.pdf.
10. Tim Murphy, Mass. Exec. Off. of Health & Human Servs., Remarks at Alliance for Health Reform Conference "The Massachusetts Health Plan: How Did They
Do It?" 5-6 (May 8, 2006) [hereinafter Murphy, "How Did They Do It?"], available at
http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/050806_Transcript-mass-164.pdf.
11. Vikki Valentine & Richard Knox, Q & A: Governor Romney on Universal

Healthcare, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Apr. 8, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld=5330792.
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Although the half-million or so residents without health care represented roughly 10% of the state's population, this percentage was
significantly lower than the 16% national average. Plus, a notably
higher percentage of Massachusetts residents benefited from employer-provided insurance. In Massachusetts, 68% of residents received insurance through their employer, compared to the national
average of 61%.12 While the 12.7% of insured residents in Massachusetts receiving coverage through Medicaid was on par with the
12.8% national average, it is important to note that 20% of those
who were uninsured in Massachusetts before implementation of
the new law-about 106,000 people-were eligible for Medicaid
13
but were not enrolled.
In addition to its comparatively lower number of uninsured, the
Commonwealth's tax structure and its access to millions in federal
resources from Medicaid offered unique opportunities to fund the
projected $1.2 billion reform without imposing additional state
taxes. In Massachusetts, like other states, hospitals have provided
emergency and other medical services to thousands of uninsured
patients. In other parts of the country especially, this has been a
significant driver of premium cost escalation. States frequently use
hospital surcharges or other techniques to generate revenues from
patients who have coverage in order to cross-subsidize hospitals for
caring for those who lack coverage. Massachusetts applies an explicit tax to insurance companies and businesses to fund the Commonwealth's Free Care Pool for the uninsured.14 Insurance
companies typically pass these added costs on to the insured by
15
way of premium hikes that effectively function as an implicit tax.
As a result, before enactment of the reform statute, hospitals
would pay the full costs of uninsured patients upfront; the Commonwealth would then reimburse them for medical services
through its $1 billion uncompensated care pool.' 6 In essence, this
amounted to a $1 billion per year subsidy for the uninsured that
had become a financial headache for the insurance industry and a
glaring liability for the state in securing federal Medicaid funding.
Facing shortfalls in funding the Free Care Pool by relying on employer-sponsored and other private insurance, Massachusetts had
12. KAISER COMM'N, KEY FACTS, supra note 9, at 1.
13. Murphy, "How Did They Do It?", supra note 10, at 7.
14. See Lauren Klepac & Robert Gutierrez. Dr. Jonathan Gruber: Professor of
Economics at MIT, HEINZ SCH. REV., Vol. 3, Issue 2, Oct. 2006, available at http://
journal.heinz.cmu.edu/articles/interview-dr-jonathan-gruber.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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increasingly used federal Medicaid dollars to support its hospital
reimbursement transfers.' 7 In 2006, it became clear that the strategy of borrowing from Medicaid funds was on borrowed time. By
that point, the federal government was threatening to withhold
$385 million in Medicaid funding unless Massachusetts developed a
plan to apply federal resources more strategically. 8 Facing such a
considerable loss of federal resources made it clear to legislators
and stakeholders alike that the time to act had arrived.
Just as the federal government's threat to withhold Medicaid
funds was at the core of the immediate funding crisis, the reallocation of uncompensated care funds was at the heart of the new plan.
Seeking to maximize and capitalize upon the millions available in
federal dollars, the new law converted the Free Care Pool from a
hospital reimbursement fund into a premium assistance support resource for the uninsured. 19 This change allowed the state to renew
its Medicaid waiver under § 1315 of the Social Security Act, 20 and
secure an additional $385 million federal transfer.2 ' These
amounts, combined with the $1 billion in state funds, laid the financial foundation to increase access to coverage and reduce costs by
transforming the overall insurance market.
Putting a financing plan in place enabled policymakers to analyze the characteristics of the uninsured and design a largely consumer-driven program based on personal responsibility.
Identifying and enrolling the estimated 20% of the uninsured in
Massachusetts who are eligible for Medicaid into MassHealth-the
state's Medicaid program-should be, at least in theory, fairly
straightforward to accomplish using administrative resources already in place. 22 However, dealing with the remaining 80% of the
uninsured who are not eligible for Medicaid poses far greater legislative, financial, and political complexities. At the time of reform,
approximately 150,000 to 200,000 uninsured individuals in Massa17. See

JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., URBAN INST., CARING FOR THE UNINSURED

MASSACHUSETTS:

WHAT DOES IT COST, WHO PAYS, AND WHAT WOULD FULL

IN

COV-

ADD TO MEDICAL SPENDING? 32 (2004), available at http://www.bcbsmafoundation.org/foundationroot/en-US/documents/roadmapReport.pdf.
18. Edmund Haisimaier, The Significance of Massachusetts Health Reform, HERITAGE FOUND., at 3, Apr. 11, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/
wm1035.cfm?renderforprint=t.
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315 (West 2000) (allowing states to receive federal Medicaid
funding while they experiment or implement pilot programs to provide health services
to low income groups).
21. See Klepac & Gutierrez, supra note 14.
22. See Murphy, supra note 10, at 7.
ERAGE
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chusetts earned too much to be covered through Medicaid, but also
earned less than 300% of the federal poverty level, or $29,412 per
23
person per year, and could not afford basic premiums.
Equally significant were the roughly 200,000 individuals who
earned more than 300% of the federal poverty level, but still could
not-or would not-purchase insurance due to high costs, poor
value, little consumer choice, or overly-restrictive risk pools,
among others reasons.24 Taking into consideration available state
financing, the various needs of the uninsured and the characteristics of the market, the authors of the new Massachusetts plan devised a multi-faceted strategy for achieving universal coverage by
2009. Adopting a thesis of shared responsibility, it requires everyone, from the poorest individual to the wealthiest corporation, to
play a part in accomplishing this goal.
B.

Insurance Coverage for Low-income Groups: The Individual
Mandate and MassHealth Expansion
Perhaps one of the most controversial, and surely one of the
most innovative aspects of the Massachusetts law is that it required
all Medicaid ineligible residents eighteen years and older to
purchase private health care insurance if the Connector deemed
them able to afford coverage. July 2007 was the initial deadline
for obtaining coverage, but it was subsequently extended to December 30, 2007. Representatives of the Connector indicate that
no further extensions will be granted and penalties will be assessed
for those who remain uninsured in 2008.25 Although subject to a
hardship waiver, any person not insured by the deadline is subject
to penalty,26 starting with the loss of their personal tax exemption
followed by increasingly severe penalties in subsequent years.27
The statute provides that the actual amount of the penalty shall be
set by the state's Department of Revenue, but it can be as high as
one half of what the individual's minimum monthly premium
would be if coverage were to be obtained through the Connector. 28
For the 2007 tax year, the individual penalty is $210, an amount
which many of those affected have already expressed a preference
23. Id. at 14-15.
24. Id. at 2-3.
25. Audio file: Comments of Jon Kingsdale, "Your Call: Health Care-The
Show", (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.wbur.orglweblogs/commonhealth/?9=312.

26.
§ 13.

MASS. GEN. LAWS

27. Id.
28. Id.

ch. 111M, § 2(b) (2006) reprinted in 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58,
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for, rather than the thousands of dollars that are needed to obtain
coverage. In response, the Department of Revenue has indicated
that for the 2008 tax year, it will increase the individual penalties
for those earning above 150% of the poverty level. Depending on
income, penalties will range from $210 to as high as $912 per year
and are subject to adjustment each year thereafter. 29 At first
glance, the individual mandate may seem to place an impossible
burden upon lower-income families, but it is a cornerstone to increasing access while reforming the insurance market. In deciding
to mandate individual coverage, Massachusetts has ostensibly altered the manner in which the Commonwealth and hospitals will
provide medical attention to the uninsured. As noted earlier, the
Commonwealth previously subsidized hospitals by directly reimbursing expenditures incurred in attending the uninsured. The new
plan will gradually transform the Free Care Pool from a hospital
financial assistance program into a financial resource for assisting
individuals in purchasing private health care. In this way, the law
seeks to ensure a more sustainable use of public finances while simultaneously increasing access to coverage. Although hospital reimbursements will undoubtedly continue until universality is
achieved, the law envisions a steady reduction in hospital subsidization as coverage continually expands.
Key to implementing this financial reallocation is the newly created Commonwealth Care Insurance Program.3 0 Its primary function is to subsidize the approximately 200,000 residents who earn
too much to be covered through Medicaid, but whose low earnings
make it difficult, if not impossible to purchase the mandated coverage without financial assistance. 31 Commonwealth Care is intended to enable the state to provide subsidies on a sliding scale to
those individuals who earn up to 300% of the federal poverty
level. 32 Notably, individuals earning less than 133% of the federal
poverty level are not required to pay any premiums. 3 3 For exam29. Mass. Dept. of Revenue, Draft Technical Information Release 07-18: Individual Mandate Penalties for Tax Year 2008, http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=dorterminal
&L=7&LO=Home&Ll=Businesses&L2=Help+%26+Resources & L3= Legal + Library
& L4 = Technical + Information + Releases & L5 = TIRs + - + By + Year(s) & L6 = 2007 +
Releases&sid=Ador&b=terminalcontent&f--dorrul-regtir-tir 07 _18 draft&csid=
Ador (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
30. Murphy, supra note 10, at 14.
31. Id.
32. MAss. GEN. LAWS. ch. 118E, § 9A (2006) reprinted in 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58,
§15.
33. See 130 MAss. CODE REGS. § 505.002 (2008). See also KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Key Facts:
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pie, an individual making up to $14,700 per year, or 150% of the
poverty line, is required to pay an $18 monthly premium towards
private coverage while a person earning $29,412 per year will pay
$106 per month. 4 It must be emphasized that the Commonwealth
Care Insurance Program is not an insurance plan. Rather, it simply
facilitates the purchase of coverage. All insurance plans under this
program must be purchased, free of deductibles, from private insurance companies. In the first three years of implementation,
only those insurance companies that currently offer plans through
Medicaid5 are permitted to compete in this sector of the insurance
3
market.
In addition to improving access to coverage through the partially
subsidized individual mandate, the law also increases eligibility and
benefits under the Medicaid program itself. Eligibility for
MassHealth is raised to cover all children who fall within 300%
above the federal poverty line.3 6 It is hoped that this adjustment
will expand Medicaid coverage to an estimated 90,000 children.3 7
Whether it will succeed is another matter, especially given President Bush's vetoes of Congress's attempts to expand the federally
3s
funded State Children's Health Insurance Program ("SCHIP").
Those earning within 133% of the poverty line will continue to
have premium-free access to health care.39 The Act also restores
dental and vision benefits to all MassHealth beneficiaries.4 0
Through the end of 2006, the Commonwealth had signed up 29,000
individuals who had been eligible for these benefits but had not
previously enrolled, and by December 2007, estimates of the newly
insured ranged from 200,00041 to 300,000 people. 42 Of these, apMassachusetts Healthcare Reform Plan: An Update 1 (June 2007), http://www.kff.
org/uninsured/upload/7494-02.pdf [hereinafter KAISER COMM'N, KEY FACTS
UPDATE].

34. Editorial, What's With This Health Law?, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2006, at
A14.
35. Murphy, supra note 10, at 14.
36. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118H, § 3 (2006) reprinted in 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58,

§ 45.
37.

KAISER COMM'N, KEY FACTS, supra note 9, at 2.
38. See Susan Milligan, Patrick Blasts Romney for Medical Aid Stance,

BOSTON

Sept. 29, 2007, at A7.
39. See 130 MAss. CODE REGS. § 505.002 (2008). See also KAISER COMM'N, KEY
FACTS UPDATE, supra note 33, at 1-2.
40. HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND AFFORDABILITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
GLOBE,

41. CHRISTINE BARBER & MICHAEL MILLAR, CMTY. CATALYST, INC., REVISITING
MASSACHUSET-IS HEALTH REFORM: 18 MONTHS LATER 6 (Dec. 2007), http://www.
communitycatalyst.org/doc-store/publications/
revisiting-MA-healthreformdec07.pdf.
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proximately one third are thought to be privately insured with the
remainder being fully or partially subsidized by the state.4 3
Lawmakers fully anticipated the political opposition and financial obstacles that would greet the individual mandate, and considered a variety of issues in justifying this aspect of the new reform
plan. The legislature and governor agreed that without subsidies
and market reforms, forcing individuals to purchase insurance in
the current market would be impossible for most and unfair to all.
Nevertheless, the state was already subsidizing the uninsured
through inefficient, if not wasteful, hospital reimbursements. If
subsidies were to be paid, the plan's architects reasoned, those
funds would be better spent on bringing all persons into the insurance market. Thus, it became apparent to all that subsidizing lowincome consumers and transforming the market to offer affordable
insurance options were critical to ending the status quo. As a result, the law mandates premium rates according to income levels
and contemplates a variety of market reforms to increase consumer
options while reducing premiums to more accessible levels.
While the overall logic has been widely accepted, many believe
that the mandated rates and out-of-pocket expenses required for
low income families remain unaffordable and must be substantially
lowered in order for the plan to succeed. For example, the Greater
Boston Interfaith Organization ("GBIO") conducted an early analysis of how the individual mandates would affect those families eligible for subsidized assistance under Commonwealth Care. It
found that 46.1% of families that fell between 100% and 300% of
the federal poverty level could not afford the premiums under the
approved payment scheme, and that 38% of those surveyed reported negative monthly earnings.4 4
If it is true that nearly half of the 200,000 or so individuals living
between 100% and 300% of the poverty line are unable to afford
insurance at the subsidized rates, the basic premise of the program
may be crippled. The law makes clear that if the mandated premiums have been miscalculated and are unaffordable, they become
42. See Commonwealth Connector, About the Connector: Overview, http://www.
mahealthconnector.org/portal/site/connector (follow "About Us" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
43. Id.
44. GREATER BOSTON INTERFAITH ORG., MANDATING HEALTH CARE INSURANCE: WHAT IS Truly Affordable for Massachusetts Families? 1 (Dec. 2006) http:H
[hereinafter GBIO, MANDATING
www.gbio.org/maint/affordability-report.doc
HEALTH CARE INSURANCE].
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unenforceable. 45 As a result, if a portion of beneficiaries were unable to purchase insurance, the Commonwealth would be forced to
continue bankrolling hospitals while also paying millions in subsidies to those covered. Funding the mandated subsidies while also
paying considerable hospital reimbursements would exacerbate an
already untenable burden for the state. Plus, it would not only increase inefficient government spending but would do so while leaving thousands uncovered-an outcome that would dramatically
and possibly fatally undermine the law's objectives.
The viability of the individual mandate along with its intended
impact on the overall insurance market demands that affordable
plans be available. It was therefore paramount for lawmakers and
insurers to reach consensus in defining affordability. This seemed
unlikely in early 2006, as Governor Mitt Romney initially insisted
that average monthly costs could total around $200, while insurers
continually argued that average premiums would hover around
$320 per month.46
The inability of state regulators and insurance companies to
agree on affordable premium rates seemed destined to impede the
law's successful implementation. However, on March 3, 2007, the
Connector Board and the seven participating insurers reached a
compromise, which has kept the program on solid ground. At least
for now, monthly premium rates are reduced to an average of $175
per month, while out-of-pocket expenses will be permitted to fluctuate according to particular plans. This breakthrough is a step in
the right direction, especially because the low premiums include
benefits such as prescription drugs, office visits, and outpatient surgery. It is important to note, however, that lower premiums were
obtained by permitting higher co-payments and deductibles. As a
result, total payments for medical attention could potentially nullify or at least minimize the intended effect of having relatively affordable premiums.47 It also remains to be seen whether low
income individuals and families will be able to pay even these modest premiums and related expenses.48
Obviously, health care reform in Massachusetts will not be sustainable if it is not affordable, and affordability is a mounting
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 4 (2006) reprinted in 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58,
§ 12.
46. See Robert Steinbrook, HealthcareReform in Massachusetts-A Work in Progress, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2095, 2097 (2006).
47. See GBIO, MANDATING HEALTH CARE INSURANCE, supra note 44, at 14.
48. See id. at 18.
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worry with regard to subsidizing the individual mandate. Early reports indicate that the state grossly underestimated its own costs in
covering the previously uninsured.4 9 In 2006, projected enrollment
in the state subsidized Commonwealth Care program ranged from
140,000 to 160,000, but by January 2008, 169,000 had joined; by
2011 enrollment may surge to 342,000 with an attendant cost to the
state of $1.35 billion. 50 Lawmakers are considering raising needed
revenues through new cigarette taxes and raising employer penalties which would surely jeopardize the employer support that the
51
Massachusetts law has enjoyed so far.
C.

Employer Responsibility for Uninsured Workers
In addition to the individual mandate and expanded Medicaid
coverage, the law also emphasizes employer responsibility. At the
time of the law's enactment, over 200,000 Massachusetts residents
were estimated to earn more than 300% of the federal poverty rate
but were unable or unwilling to purchase private insurance.52
Many of these individuals work for small and medium-size businesses that do not offer health benefits. In addressing this segment
of the uninsured population, the Massachusetts law established important provisions for businesses with eleven or more full time employees and those with ten or more full and part-time workers.
Under reform, employers with eleven or more full time workers
must make a "reasonable contribution" towards employee insurance plans by enrolling at least 25% of workers in employer-sponsored health insurance, or contributing 33% towards the cost of
individual health plans for all full-time employees.53 Any company
with eleven or more full time workers that chooses not to contribute directly to a worker's private health benefits must make a
yearly $295 per employee "fair share contribution" to the uncompensated care pool. 54 Furthermore, businesses with eleven or more
full time equivalent employees were required to adopt Internal
Revenue Code section 125 "cafeteria" plans-initially by July 1,
2007 and subsequently by January 1, 2008 .5 Basically, a cafeteria
49. Alice Dembner, Undercount of Uninsured Attributed to Flawed System, BosTON GLOBE, Feb. 3, 2008, at A15.

50. Id.
51. Alice Dembner, DiMasi,Murray Mull Increase in Cigarette Tax: Funds Would
Help Cover Healthcare Costs, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2008, at B1.
52. See Murphy, supra note 10, at 7.
53. 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. § 16.03 (2006).
54. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188 (2006).
55. 956 MASS. CODE REGS. § 4.00 (2006).
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plan allows employees to choose between taxable benefits (such as
cash) and at least one "qualified" benefit on a pre-tax basis, such as
accident or health insurance, group term life insurance, or adoption
assistance.56 Cafeteria plans are intended to be attractive to businesses and employees alike, as they allow workers to pay for health
coverage on a pre-tax basis and provide them with greater choice
in selecting health plans, while also allowing companies to save on
Federal Insurance Contribution Act ("FICA") taxes. 7 Companies
that fail to offer cafeteria plans will be charged a "free-rider" penalty to help fund employees who seek uncompensated care on multiple occasions. The exact amount of the surcharge will vary
depending upon a variety of factors, including number of employees, the number of state funded visits, and the total costs to the
state. 8 It is hoped that the modest "fair share" contribution and
the section 125 fiscal benefits will encourage small businesses in
particular to contribute to employee coverage, as they are less
likely to offer direct coverage to their workers. 9
Because employers were given through the end of 2007 to comply with the new law, it is too soon to know how aggressively the
Commonwealth will impose penalties and how employers will respond. Early indications are that employers have been remarkably
cooperative, exceeding the Connector's initial projections. Even
with full compliance, however, the impact on workers can be significant and in some cases, burdensome. For example, a Burger King
franchisee that had previously covered only senior staff expanded
coverage to include all full-time workers, but did so by halving its
own contribution to the cost of that coverage.6" Other firms that
had previously covered part-time employees have tightened eligibility by increasing the minimum hours needed to qualify for coverage. Under either approach, some workers received access to
56. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FAQs FOR GOVERNMENT ENTITIES REGARDING
CAFETERIA PLANS, http://www.irs.gov/govt/fslg/article/o,,id=112720,00.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
57. THE COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR, EMPLOYER HANDBOOK 4 (Nov. 1, 2007),
http://www.mahealthconnector.org/porta/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.
servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/Findlnsurance/Employer/Overview/Employer%20
Handbook.pdf.
58. Id. at 5.
59. See Robert Moffit & Nina Owcharenko, UnderstandingKey Parts of the Massachusetts Health Plan, HERITAGE FOUND., Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/
Research/HealthCare/wm1045.cfm.
60. See Alice Dembner, Firms Find Ways Around State Health Law, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2007, at Al.
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previously unavailable coverage, but others lost a significant means
of paying for that coverage.6 1
Unfortunately, but not unpredictably, there are employers that
have dropped coverage altogether. In these instances, the cost of
covering all eligible workers may prove to be too burdensome, especially when compared with the less-expensive option of paying
$295 per-worker to the state. At least one employer has opted to
avoid state requirements entirely by establishing separate corporations of less than the eleven full time workers needed to trigger the
employer mandate.62 Still others are expected to circumvent the
law by converting employees to independent contractor status.
Again, given that this is the first year in which compliance is required, it is too early to appreciate fully how employers will behave
and how state regulators will respond.
Despite the strong consensus surrounding the evolution and enactment of this law, the employer mandate has been strongly criticized by both liberals and conservatives. Critics are quick to point
out that the term "employer provided health care" is a misnomer,
and reject the implicit assumption that employers pay for health
care. Because health coverage is actually a component of an employee's overall compensation package, it is the worker who actually pays for the insurance. Consequently, any funds transferred
from a company to an insurance provider on the employee's behalf
are proportionately reflected in decreasing salaries. 63 Some conservatives also argue that the required contribution amounts to a
second tax upon business. In their view, it overly burdens businesses that already contribute to the uncompensated pool through
the state health insurance premium tax. 64 Because increased business taxation can be particularly difficult for small companies, this
could lead to downsizing or migration to other states. 65 The potential loss of jobs could instigate further increases in the ranks of uninsured individuals in the Commonwealth.
In contrast, many business leaders, reform advocates, and state
lawmakers insist that the $295 penalty is too lenient for private
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Nina Owcharenko & Robert E. Moffit, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Lessons for the States, HERITAGE FOUND., at 7, July 18, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/
Research/HealthCare/bg1953.cfm.
64. Id.
65. See Anna D. Sinaiko, Employers' Responses To A Play-Or-Pay Mandate: An
Analysis Of California'sHealth InsuranceAct Of 2003, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 13, 2004,
at W4-474, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hthaff.w4.469vl.
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companies and assert that the law should demand more of employers. 66 The Smaller Business Association of New England, a nonprofit organization with 700 members, has argued that most of its
members already contribute 50% to 80% of their workers' health
care premiums. Member-companies reason that although they
have the financial wherewithal to continue paying for employee
premiums and many are willing to continue, the new low annual
figure of $295 actually provides them with a financial incentive to
stop.6 7 In response to this argument and similar arguments made
by Affordable Care Today, a Massachusetts advocacy organization,
State Senator Mark Montigny recently submitted a bill entitled, An
Act Strengthening Health Reform. Among other key provisions, it
would require that companies pay at least 50% of individual
premiums.68
D.

The Commonwealth Connector & Insurance Market Reform

Debate over the individual and employer mandates has revealed
significant reservations about the law-at least among certain
stakeholders-especially with regard to affordability. One aspect
of the law that might alleviate at least some of these concerns is its
call for insurance market reforms since these will hopefully reduce
premiums for the uninsured while expanding consumer choice. At
the heart of this feature of overall reform is the newly created
Commonwealth Health Insurance "Connector" which sets affordability standards, assists low-income groups in paying for coverage, and provides tools to help individuals and employers find
affordable health insurance coverage. The Connector is an independent public authority, which is administered by the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority and overseen by a
ten-member board of representatives from the public and private
sectors.6 9 It basically functions as a centralized clearinghouse that
matches insurance buyers with sellers. As such, it is the glue that
holds the entire health care reform plan together. Often compared
to a stock exchange for health insurance, the Connector brings together willing providers and consumers into one centralized mar66. See, e.g., Jeffrey Krasner, Business Leaders Suggest Health Law Too Easy on
Firms, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2007, at C1.

67. Id.
68. S. 661, 185th Sess. (Mass. 2007).
69. Commonwealth Connector, About the Connector: Leadership, http://www.
mahealthconnector.org/portal/site/connector/ (follow "About Us" hyperlink; then follow "Leadership" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
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ketplace intended to facilitate consumer-driven competition. y
Like the stock market, the underlying assumption is that economic
efficiency can be increased through a central mechanism that promotes competition and, therefore, facilitates information-sharing,
communication, and the collection and transmission of payments.
The Connector is considered by many to be the most innovative
mechanism of the Massachusetts program. In addition to electronically linking buyers and sellers by facilitating information exchange through one centralized source, the Connector is structured
to increase access and reduce costs by pooling consumers, thus increasing consumer leverage and bargaining power. Prior to the
law's enactment, insurance markets in Massachusetts were deeply
fragmented between individual and group markets. Lacking the
leverage of group plans, persons not covered through their employer were typically limited to plans that cost substantially more
and offered considerably less. To assuage this disparity, the Massachusetts Legislature was determined to make the Connector marketplace accessible to purchasers consisting of both individuals and
small businesses (which the law defines as having fifty or fewer employees). By merging the small business and individual markets,
the Connector-at least in theory-expands consumer choice and
increases consumer bargaining power while helping to reduce individual premiums by an estimated 24%.71
Employer participation in the Connector is not mandatory, but
the law offers important incentives for small businesses to insure
their employees through this mechanism. For those companies
that previously did not offer coverage to their employees, the Connector provides an affordable and administratively simple alternative. Now, whether or not a small business is new to the health
insurance market, it can look to the Connector for help in establishing its group plan as the Connector facilitates information regarding options from which small business can choose. Equally
important, the Connector can enable small businesses already providing group insurance to free themselves of the administrative
burdens associated with employee coverage.
While the Connector framework offers clear benefits to employers, its flexibility and consumer-driven focus makes it especially attractive to individual purchasers. Unlike most employer-sponsored
programs, the Connector allows eligible employees to select the
products and options that best suit their needs and financial re70. See Haisimaier, supra note 18, at 2.
71. KAISER COMM'N, KEY FACTS, supra note 9, at 1.
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sources. Because private companies will vie for buyers in this new
market model and consumers are free to choose from a variety of
policies, market principles suggest that premium costs will decline
as competition increases. By promoting consumer choice, this aspect of the plan will hopefully benefit both insurers and individual
purchasers. In theory at least, private insurance companies are
given the opportunity to generate new business while consumers
can now demand more quality and value.
A key feature of the Connector is its role in supporting
workforce mobility by facilitating consumer portability. Once consumers select and purchase an insurance plan, they are free to
move to different jobs without the threat of losing the insurance
benefits already obtained through the Connector.72 This should be
considered one of the plan's greatest innovations. Prior to reform,
workers with employer-sponsored insurance were often discouraged from exploring more promising or suitable career opportunities for fear of losing benefits. By ensuring portability, however,
the Connector mechanism reinforces worker autonomy and levels
the playing field between employers and employees. Along these
lines, the legislation also preserves employee tax benefits by excluding employer or worker contributions from taxable income, allows double-income families to combine employer contributions
toward the plan of their choice, and permits part-time workers to
combine payments from various employers.73
In addition to strengthening competition and consumer autonomy, the Connector also expands quality coverage for segments of
the population with low coverage rates.74 In Massachusetts and
elsewhere, nineteen to twenty-six year olds are often reluctant or
unable to seek individual coverage. In that age group, salaries are
generally low; plus, many younger residents place a low priority on
purchasing health insurance given their financial constraints and
their statistically lower risk of needing health care. Yet their health
status, at least as a demographic group, is the precise reason why
their presence is so important for spreading risk-and costs-in insurance risk pools. In recognition of this, the law mandates that
this age group be covered,75 and provides a variety of mechanisms
for achieving coverage. The Connector offers individual coverage
72. See 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58, §§ 96-100, as amended by Technical Corrections
Act of 2006, 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 324, § 52.
73. See Haislmaier, supra note 18, at 3.
74. See Technical Corrections Act of 2006, 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 324, § 34.
75. Id.
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at reduced rates to young adults through the age of twenty-six who
lack their own employer-sponsored health benefits and are not
covered by a parent's family plan. The law also requires family
health plans to cover children for two years after they become independent from their parents or reach the age of twenty-five.76
This is a sizeable gain for those who would previously have been
cut off from family coverage at approximately age twenty-one or
earlier if not full-time students.
The Connector's role, however, extends beyond simply matching
willing buyers with sellers. Its ten-person Connector Authority
also determines the required coverage that insurance companies
must offer in order to participate in the Connector-administered
market. In addition, the board sets the affordability standard for
subsidized monthly premiums under the individual mandate, and
negotiates deductible costs with insurance companies. Finally, the
board administers the Commonwealth Care Program77for residents
with incomes below 300% the federal poverty level.
While the Connector represents an important innovation in the
expansion of health insurance and is widely recognized as such, it is
not without its detractors. As previously discussed, the Connector's success or failure will largely depend upon the affordability of
plans offered. Assuming that reasonably priced options are made
available, critics argue that the Connector may increase general access to care, but will do little to equalize access to, or increase consumer choice of quality coverage.78 Thomas Miller of the
American Enterprise Institute indicates that the Connector's ability to promote competition among providers is merely illusory
since consumer choice for those with incomes between 100% and
300% of the federal poverty level remains limited to the four current Medicaid operators.79
Perhaps the Connector's most fundamental and, therefore,
troubling limitation is that despite the obvious merits of expanding
coverage, it does too little to contain administrative costs and does
nothing to address other cost drivers, such as overall utilization
patterns and specific consumption of technology and prescription
drugs. Increasing coverage, and thus utilization of health care,
76. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 108 (2006).
77. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118H (2006) reprinted in 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58, § 45.
78. See Deborah White, Pros and Cons of MassachusettsMandatory Health Insurance Program, ABOUT.COM, http://usliberals.about.com/od/healthcare/i/MassHealth
Ins.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
79. Thomas Miller, Massachusetts: More Mirage than Miracle, 25 HEALTH AFF.
W451 (2006), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w450.
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without addressing such key components of overall expenditures
will make sustaining such a plan difficult without additional tax
revenues."0 The Massachusetts Medical Society is already reporting a shortage of primary care physicians for the second consecutive year." This shortage may continue and potentially worsen as
more people gain coverage and use more care. Although significant delays in accessing care have not yet become a problem, the
increasing number of enrollees and the dwindling number of available doctors could pose serious challenges.
The basic logic of Massachusetts' approach to health care reform
has obvious appeal: reduce uncompensated care by lowering the
cost of coverage by "managing" the competition among insurance
carriers for a larger and more risk-diverse pool of purchasing dollars. Despite its theoretical strengths, the plan has already faced
obstacles to implementation. On April 13, 2007, the Connector
Board made perhaps its most strategic decision yet by voting to
exempt 20% of uninsured residents from the individual mandate
while also increasing access to MassHealth for those earning up to
133% of the federal poverty level.82 The decision was made largely
in response to the tenacious lobbying efforts of a coalition of civic
organizations concerned about affordability and fairness. As a result of this decision, some 60,000 low and moderate income residents unable to afford insurance at the reduced rates will not be
penalized for a failure to obtain coverage. Clearly, this temporarily
detracts from true universality. More importantly, however, the
Connector Board's action in this instance reveals that it correctly
recognizes the need to work closely with different constituencies in
addressing practical necessities and to be flexible in making key
modifications as needed. It also demonstrates that health care affordability and, indeed, the viability of overall health care reform,
must be continually reevaluated with adjustments being made according to evolving circumstances.

80. See Steinbrook, supra note 46, at 2095-96.
81. Doug Trapp, MassachusettsHealth Reform Builds Momentum, But Will a Physician Shortage Lead to Long Waits for Enrollees in State's New Insurance Plan?,
AMNEWS, Oct. 1, 2007, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/10/01/gvsblOOl.htm.
82. See 130 MASS. CODE REGS. § 505.002 (2008); see also Julie Appleby, Mass
Health Plan Finds Cost is too High for 20% of People, USA TODAY, Apr.13, 2007,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2007-04-13-mass-usatN.htm.
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PREEMPTION: AN ENDURING THREAT TO
SUCCESSFUL STATE REFORM

Massachusetts' universal coverage plan follows years of frustration among the states arising out of dramatic spikes in both costs
and the number of uninsured, as chronic gridlock blocked meaningful federal action. While congressional intransigence has forced
states to take the reins of health care reform, it has also erected
formidable obstacles to doing so. Of the many daunting challenges
facing any state health care reform plan, preemption by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 1974 is potentially the most onerous.
A.

ERISA's § 514 Preemption Clause

Congress passed ERISA8 3 to protect employee benefit plan participants and their beneficiaries by federalizing regulation of plan
administration "to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal Government. '84 While fraud and
mismanagement in the pension context inspired ERISA's enactment, health benefits were swept within its purviewA5 The statute
does not require employers to offer benefits, 86 but instead controls
the administration of benefit plans through detailed provisions
concerning plan design and administration, including reporting and
disclosure requirements, 87 participation and vesting provisions, 88
funding standards,8 9 and plan administrator fiduciary obligations.90
Such detailed directives evidence Congress' preoccupation with
pension benefits, and contrast starkly with ERISA's virtual silence
about health benefits.
To prevent unduly complicated and potentially contradictory
state regulation of the administration of employee benefits plans,
ERISA also contains a three-part "conflict" preemption provi83. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq (2008)).
84. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990).
85. ERISA applies to employee welfare and pension benefit plans that provide
"medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits" for plan participants and their beneficiaries "through the purchase of insurance or otherwise." 29 U.S.C.A. §1002(1) (West
2008).
86. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 651 (1995).
87. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-1031 (West 2008).
88. See id. §§ 201-211.
89. See id. §§ 301-308.

90. See id.

§§ 1131-1145.
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sion.91 Section 514(a) states that ERISA shall "supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan." 92 The "relate to" clause is limited by the
"saving" clause, which saves or excludes from preemption those
state laws that would satisfy the relate to clause but nevertheless
qualify as, inter alia, state insurance law. 93 The saving clause is itself limited by the "deemer" clause which precludes states from
"deeming" a law to constitute insurance regulation for the purpose
of "saving" a law which would otherwise "relate to" a plan so as to
be preempted. The convoluted structure of § 514 is exacerbated by
the absence of any statutory definition of "relate to" or explanation of what constitutes state insurance law for the purposes of the
saving and deemer clauses.
Preemption of state remedies under the relate to clause leaves
only those remedies available under ERISA's § 502's civil enforcement scheme which allows equitable relief, but does not include
monetary damages, even in instances where equitable relief is
clearly inadequate.9 4 By preempting state law and granting such
limited relief, ERISA effectively provides no remedy or recourse
to patients or providers who try to challenge-or states which attempt to regulate-the conduct of employer sponsored benefit
plans. This result seems at least facially at odds with Congress'
original intent that ERISA would be an employee-protective statute. Nevertheless, ERISA has preempted patient complaints of
perceived inadequacies in plan coverage and accountability 95 and
stalled, if not derailed, state efforts to regulate the finance and delivery of health care.9 6

91. Section 502 of ERISA, which articulates the statute's exclusive remedies, is
frequently characterized as a second preemption provision in that it has been held to
completely preempt plan beneficiaries' claims which amount to alternative claims for
benefits, or challenges to the quality of benefits received. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc.
v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004).
92. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a). State laws subject to possible preemption include "all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any
State." Id. § 1144(c)(1).
93. Id. § 1144(a).
94. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (monetary damages
unavailable); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (unavailability
of extracontractual, compensatory, or punitive damages under § 502).
95. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
96. See generally, e.g., Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Troyen A. Brennan, The Critical Role of ERISA in State Health Reform, 13 HEALTH AFF. 2, 142 (1994).
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Judicial Interpretation of § 514 Preemption

Given its combination of structural complexity and definitional
ambiguity, § 514 has engendered three decades of generally expansive and unpredictable Supreme Court case law. The result is a sad
pattern of states struggling to regulate around ERISA, but usually
seeming powerless to do so. The next chapter of § 514 case law
seems destined to reveal what, if anything, states can do to enlist
employers in their efforts to rein in health care costs while expanding coverage. The key to resolving this will be the United
States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in New York Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 97 which

involved a New York hospital rate setting statute that required hospitals to impose a series of surcharges on the bills of patients who
were covered by commercial payors. 98 Unlike the "fair share" or
"play or pay" laws of Maryland, New York's Suffolk County and
Massachusetts, 99 it created no direct requirements or incentives for
employers or employer-sponsored benefits plans. This did not stop
plans from arguing that by increasing plan costs, the surcharges had
the kind of "connection with or reference to" plan administration
that had demanded § 514 preemption since Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines.1 °°
A unanimous Supreme Court disagreed, 10 1 reasoning that "[if]
'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never
10 2
run its course, for [r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere.
Thus, instead of following its prior expansive-and self-admittedly
confusing-interpretations of the relate to clause, the Court in
Travelers returned to a classical preemption analysis by engaging a
''starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant
state law."10 3 It emphasized that this presumption is particularly
strong where the state law in question involves the exercise of a
state's police power in an area traditionally left to state control,
such as health care. 104 Preemption of such traditionally state laws
will not occur unless it is determined to be "the clear and manifest
97. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
98. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2897-c (Gould 1993).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
463 U.S. 85 (1983).
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 647.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 654-55 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
Id. at 655.
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purpose of Congress. '1 0 5 Consequently, a state law that expressly
references benefits plans would directly conflict with ERISA's text
and thereby trigger § 514 preemption.1 0 6 Since the New York statute made no mention of ERISA plans, there was no "reference."
To determine whether the surcharge statute had a sufficient
"connection" with ERISA plans so as to merit preemption, the
Court stressed in now oft-quoted language:
[H]ere, an uncritical literalism is no more help than in trying to
construe "relate to." For the same reasons that infinite relations
cannot be the measure of preemption, neither can infinite connections. We simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the
frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to
of
the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope
07
the state law that Congress understood would survive.'
Congress' intent that ERISA would secure nationally uniform
plan administration did not erase the strong starting presumption
against preemption because the hospital rate setting law fell within
the state's traditional area of health care quality oversight10 8 Absent any clear congressional intent to immunize health plans from
this type of state financing legislation, it did not warrant relate to
preemption. 10 9 Rather, Congress intended relate to preemption to
displace those state laws which would overtly or effectively regulate actual plan administration. As a result, the Court reasoned,
§ 514's relate to clause preempts laws which directly mandate or
indirectly bind the choices of plan administrators or otherwise interfere with uniform plan administration.110 The New York
surcharge statute, however, only imposed an indirect economic
cost on plans which could affect-but would not bind-the plans'
"shopping decisions" concerning the administration and delivery of
benefits. " ' Moreover, relate to preemption of "medical care quality standards" in the face of congressional silence would be "unsettling" and do "grave violence" to the presumption against
preemption. 1 2 Underscoring that "nothing in the language of
[ERISA] or the context of its passage indicates that Congress
chose to displace general health care regulation, which historically
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 656.
at 655.
at 659.
at 660.
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has been a matter of local concern, ' 113 it stated that preempting
hospital rate setting legislation "would be all the more startling"
since measures of this kind were in existence when ERISA was
enacted. 1 4 The absence from both text and legislative history of
"so much as a hint .

.

. that Congress intended to squelch these

state efforts" further confirmed for the Court that Congress intended to leave this type of state law intact. 15
While certainly not the most recent Supreme Court decision to
wrestle with ERISA preemption, the Travelers opinion will surely
be important to, if not determinative of, how the new generation of
"play or pay" and "fair share" state laws fare. Early indications are
that, based on the Travelers rationale, § 514 will continue to preempt most wide scale reform at the state level because such laws go
beyond creating the kind of indirect economic costs that have
evaded preemption. At the dawn of 2007, for example, Maryland's
"Fair Share" legislation succumbed to relate to preemption in Retail Industry Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder."6 Just a few months later, a
fair share initiative in New York's Suffolk County collapsed on
similar grounds in Retail Industry Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk
County.'17 Despite significant differences between those laws and
the Massachusetts statute, Fielder and Suffolk County portend a
serious threat of ERISA preemption of at least some portions of
the Commonwealth's plan for achieving universal coverage by
2009.
Unlike Massachusetts, Maryland took a narrow approach to address the growing numbers of the uninsured and resulting increases
in uncompensated care and Medicaid claims." 8 Yet like Massachusetts, Maryland was responding to an upsurge in the state's Medi113. Id. at 661 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 665.
115. Id. Travelers' effort to balance relate to preemption with deference to state
health care oversight continued in DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund, which found that a state tax on both ERISA-funded and non-ERISA
funded health care providers was simply "one of myriad state laws of general applicability that impose[d] some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless [did] not relate to them within the statute's meaning." 520 U.S. 806, 807
(1997). Decided on the same day and completing the "Travelers trilogy," California
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham rejected ERISA preemption
of a state labor law, and again emphasized that courts must presume that Congress
never intended to override State police powers absent clear evidence of an intent to
do so. 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997).
116. 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007).
117. 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
118. See generally Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to -107 (West 2006).
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caid expenditures, a problem plaguing most states. Congress
originally envisioned Medicaid as a limited program in which government would be "the payor of last resort." 119 With joint federal
and state expenditures nearing $320 billion, however, it has increasingly become the payor of first resort as enrollments and costs
surge. In Maryland, for example, the state's portion of Medicaid
costs approximately $5 billion per year, consume some 17% of annual spending and created a budgetary shortfall of $130 million in
2006 alone.120 Declines in employer coverage have played a key
roll in escalating costs, and Wal-Mart has earned the dubious honor
of having more employees and dependents receive publicly subsidized health care than any other employer in the nation.12 ' An
internal Wal-Mart memorandum showed that 37% of its employees' children were on Medicaid and that another 19% had no insurance at all.1 22 According to one study, Georgia alone pays $10
million per year to insure 10,000 children of Wal-Mart employees. 123 By not covering its workers, Wal-Mart and similar employers not only impose burdens on the public fisc, but also create a
competitive disadvantage for smaller companies that do cover their
workers.
In Maryland, Wal-Mart employed 16,000 workers, many of
whom received inadequate coverage or no coverage at all. 124
Struggling to fund Medicaid while grappling with the growing
ranks of the uninsured and rising uncompensated care costs, Maryland passed the "Fair Share Act"'12 in 2006. Basically, the law required employers of 10,000 or more Maryland employees to spend
at least 8% of their total payrolls on employees' health care or
health insurance costs. Despite the facial neutrality of the statute's
"play or pay" language, the Act's legislative history showed that
Wal-Mart's pattern of relying on public assistance to pay for the
health care of its employees and their dependents was a critical, if
not the sole, impetus for the plan. 26
119. See Fielder, 475 F.3d at 198 (citing S. REP. No. 99-146, at 312-13 (1985), as
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 279-80) (Michael, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 199.
121. Id. at 184; see also Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Nationwide ProtestsAssail Wal-Mart and Other Companies' Health Benefits, Apr. 26 2006, http://www.rwjf.
org/programareas/features/digest.jsp?id=3426&pid=1132&gsa=1.
122. See Fielder,475 F.3d at 184.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101
to 107.
126. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 183-85.
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Claiming, inter alia, that ERISA preempted Maryland's "Fair
Share" law, the Retail Industry Leaders Association ("RILA") essentially sued on Wal-Mart's behalf, 27 although amicus briefs supporting its position were submitted by other business trade
groups. 28 RILA's basic position was that this "fair share" or "play
or pay" statute exposed benefits plan administrators to inconsistent
state directives. Forcing an employer to play or pay created the
kind of employer mandate that undermines ERISA's uniform administration. Pursuant to Travelers, then, it would be preempted
by ERISA's relate to clause. 129 In response, Maryland contended
that the law was not an impermissible employer mandate since,
rather than meet the 8% spending requirement by providing more
generous benefits, on-site medical clinics, or contributions to employee health savings accounts, the employer could simply pay the
difference between current spending and 8% of total payrolls to
the state's Medicaid fund. 30 In this way, the state argued, the law
was a generally applicable revenue statute that merely created the
kind of indirect economic impact that survived § 514 preemption
under Travelers.'3'
The state's logic failed to persuade the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. Unlike New York's hospital rate setting statute
in Travelers, which may have affected plan costs but was aimed
squarely at providers, Maryland's law directly targeted large employers. Therefore, fundamentally, the statute was not generally
applicable since it had been carefully designed to target particular
employers, most notably Wal-Mart. 32 Furthermore, the law went
127. The court found that RILA had "associational standing" under Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), because "(a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit." That only one of the association's members faced immediate or
threatened harm in this case was nevertheless sufficient to support standing under
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). Id. at 186.
128. A variety of patient advocacy groups filed amicus briefs supporting the state,
including the AARP Foundation, Medicaid Matters! Maryland, the Maryland Citizens' Health Initiative Education Fund, Inc., the National Federation of Independent
Business Legal Foundation. Amici in support of RILA included the United States
Department of Labor, the National and Maryland Chambers of Commerce, The Society for Human Resource Management, The H.R. Policy Association, and the American Benefits Council. Id. at 182.
129. See id. at 191 (citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1995)).
130. Id. at 195.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 194.
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beyond creating the kind of revenue scheme that would only affect
plan administration indirectly.' 33 Giving affected employers the
choice of making a "free rider" payment to the state instead of
setting up a benefits plan was simply not an indirect cost. Plus, it
really was no choice at all since "an employer would gain nothing
in consideration of paying a greater sum of money to the State
[and, by becoming known as a free rider] might suffer from lower
employee morale and increased public condemnation. '1 34 As a result, the law effectively interfered with plan administration by forcing the employer to restructure its plan to offer a state-imposed
minimum level of health benefits, alter its accounting practices, and
comply with the statute's reporting requirements. 135 That such administrative burdens would upset ERISA's goal of uniformity was
more than a hypothetical risk given similarly intended laws in Minnesota and two New York counties with differing financial and reporting requirements.1 36 Thus, despite the lack of any express
reference to ERISA plans, the statute established the kind of con1 37
nection with the plan that triggered § 514 relate to preemption.
Because the law was preempted, the Court of Appeals saw no need
to evaluate the defendant's equal protection challenge to the
138
statute.
The Fielder dissent was far more willing to view the statute as
analogous to the hospital surcharge statute at issue in Travelers.
Again, in Travelers, a New York hospital surcharge statute designed to cross-subsidize uncompensated care survived preemption
because it only imposed indirect economic costs on payors and
therefore lacked the connection with or reference to a plan needed
to justify § 514 preemption. 139 Maryland uses a similar approach in
its "all payor" program by factoring uncompensated care costs into
the state's determination of permissible charges for patients with
coverage. As a result, such "all payor" rates-which affect even
133. The statute did qualify as a revenue statute, however, as opposed to a tax
measure. For this reason, the court rejected RILA's claim that a federal court's approval of the statute would violate the federal Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341
(West 2008). See id. at 189.
134. See id. at 193.
135. See id. at 193-94.
136. Id. at 194 (citing N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 22-506(c)(2); Suffolk County, N.Y.,
Reg. Local Laws § 325-3; and Minnesota's pending H.F. 3143, 84th Leg. Sess. (Minn.
2006)).
137. Id. at 197.
138. Id. at 198.
139. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 662 (1995).
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Medicaid as a payor-will rise and fall with the number of patients
who lack employer sponsored health insurance. 140 The dissent
stated that this was highly analogous to having an employer contribute to Maryland's Medicaid program to fulfill its Fair Share obligations since, as recognized in Travelers, a law that merely
changes incentives or even costs without dictating choices does not
pose the kind of threat to uniformity that § 514 prevents. 4 ' The
law instead responded to the federal government's charge to states
to experiment in finding ways to bridge the gap between escalating
Medicaid costs and shrinking employer-based coverage. 14 2
The Fielder dissent's logic not only failed to rescue the Maryland
statute from preemption, but also failed to prevail in a similar challenge to a Suffolk County, New York law in Retail Industry Leaders
Ass'n v. Suffolk County.'43 Imposing reporting obligations that
were virtually identical to its Maryland counterpart, the Suffolk
County Fair Share for Health Care Act' 44 set an annual "public
health cost rate" to reflect the county's cost in covering uninsured
workers. It then directed large, non-unionized retailers to spend at
least this amount on the health benefits of each employee for each
hour worked regardless of their full or part-time status. 145 Alternatively, affected employers-which, again, essentially amounted to
Wal-Mart-could fulfill the statute's financial requirement by making a lump sum payment to a community health center equal to the
number of hours worked by employees multiplied by the public
health cost rate.141 The Suffolk County court agreed completely
with Fielder's determination that the payment alternatives provided no real choice other than to restructure benefits plans. This
impermissible interference with plan administration was the kind
of connection with an ERISA plan that necessitated preemption
under § 514's relate to clause.147
140. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 199 (Michael, J., dissenting) (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
§§ 19-211, 214, 219).
141. Judge Michael observed that "[a] statute that 'alters the incentives, but does
not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans' is not preempted." Id. at 202 (quoting
Calif. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S.
316, 334 (1997)). He also noted that "[t]he ERISA preemption provision allows for
uniformity of administration and coverage, but 'cost uniformity was almost certainly
not an object of pre-emption."' Id. (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 662).
142. Id. at 203-04.
143. 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
144. Suffolk County, N.Y., Reg. Local Law §§ 325-1 to 7 (2005).
145. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d. at 406-07.
146. Id. at 410.
147. Id. at 418.
HEALTH-GEN.
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In July 2006, San Francisco enacted its "Health Care Security
Ordinance" mandating that covered employers doing business
within the city make quarterly "required health care expenditures
to or on behalf of" covered employees. 148 Just four months later,
the Golden Gate Restaurant Association ("GGRA") challenged
the ordinance on ERISA § 514 "relate to" preemption grounds.
Remarkably, it obtained a favorable decision from the federal district court just a few weeks later. 1 49 The city immediately appealed
and, within two weeks, managed to obtain a stay of the lower
court's injunction pending a full disposition of the merits by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 150 What is most surprising
about the stay is that the three-judge panel found a likelihood that
the city would succeed in defending the ordinance against preemption. 51 The GGRA has indicated that should the city prevail at the
1 52
circuit level, it will seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
C.

The Massachusetts Act's Chances of Surviving Preemption

In terms of state efforts to reform health care, Massachusetts has
adopted a more comprehensive approach than the one preempted
in Maryland, partly because targeting a particular employer raises
both § 514 and equal protection concerns, but largely because the
reasons for rising costs and shrinking coverage are far more complex than the actions of any one type of employer or employment
sector. Instead of targeting a particular source of uninsured workers, therefore, it relies on a blend of insurance market reforms, individually mandated insurance purchases, and employer "play or
pay" incentives to achieve universal coverage by 2009. Nevertheless, while its language and design attempt to avoid creating the
sort of employer "mandate" that will trigger ERISA preemption,
its use of employer "play or pay" provisions are potentially just as
vulnerable to § 514 preemption as Maryland's and Suffolk
County's reliance on similar measures.
148. S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a) (2007). Whether employers are covered by the
regulation depends on the employer's average number of covered employees during a
quarter. Whether an employee is covered will turn on weekly hours and overall
length of employment. See id.
149. See Golden Gate Restaurant Assn v. City and County of San Francisco, 535 F.
Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
150. See Golden Gate Restaurant Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 512
F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2008).
151. See id.
152. See Press Release, Golden Gate Restaurant Ass'n, Employer Mandated
Health Care (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.ggra.org/news.asp?newsid=16046&menuid=
1248&submenuid=1794.
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The Commonwealth's individual mandate is most likely to withstand preemption. As previously discussed, the most obvious
worry regarding the individual mandate is that it may not be economically sustainable. Even after extensive debate and negotiation
of plans and premiums, fears linger that premiums may be too high
for the insured, too low for the insurer and will therefore require
too much in the way of state subsidies. Conceivably, however, an
employer could argue that another problem with the individual
mandate is that it is preempted under ERISA § 514 due to its impact on employers. Employers that do sponsor coverage will now
need to offer a plan that satisfies the law's minimum coverage requirements for individuals or pay the consequences. According to
this logic, the individual mandate essentially serves as an employer
mandate that has an impermissible connection with an employee
benefits plan under Shaw.
Yet the Shaw test was curtailed in Travelers precisely because
conceivably, through an endless cascade of impacts and consequences, any legislative action can influence the decisions of an
employer sponsored benefits plan. To allow this to trigger preemption would make § 514 even more expansive than it already is and
potentially subvert any kind of state health care law. The Travelers
Court refused to go this far when it stated, "[f]or the same reasons
that infinite relations cannot be the measure of pre-emption,
'
neither can infinite connections." 153
Given the state's traditional
primacy in state health care regulation, it is unlikely that a court
would read ERISA as precluding states from requiring its individual citizens to obtain coverage. Thus, while time may prove them
to be financially infeasible, individual mandates should evade § 514
preemption.
The "play or pay" provisions directed at employers, however, are
unlikely to fare as well given § 514 preemption of far more incremental measures in Maryland and Suffolk County. 154 For example,
like Suffolk County's effort to impose a per worker "public health
cost" on large retailers, the Massachusetts plan requires large, medium, and small employers of eleven or more workers to make a
"fair and reasonable" contribution to employee health care. 55
Massachusetts does offer options-again, of covering at least one
quarter of its workers, paying for at least one third of the total cost
153. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995).
154. See supra notes 114-45 and accompanying text.
155. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 188(a) (2006).
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of its employees' individual plans, or making the annual "fair
share" contribution to the Free Care Pool of $295 per full time
worker.' 5 6 Unlike the "no reasonable alternatives" of the Maryland and Suffolk County laws, perhaps these options will be more
attractive to employers given other insurance market reforms. The
$295 per worker fair share contribution will undoubtedly be characterized by the Commonwealth as a simple funding measure that
only imposes the kind of indirect economic impact that evaded
§ 514 preemption in Travelers. That $295 appears, at least to some,
to be a modest figure could lead many employers to go along with
the plan instead of launching a preemption challenge. For some,
however, paying $295 per worker per year might be difficult. For
others, the thought of any charge at any amount is intolerable, especially at this early stage of wide scale state health reform. And
for all, significant resources may be consumed in fulfilling the statute's record keeping and reporting requirements. Since the courts
have focused on the kinds of measures used, and not the costs of
those measures, the per worker fee, no matter how slight, might be
preempted as an impermissible interference with plan
administration.
Most significantly, these alternatives may devolve to false
choices and, accordingly, effective mandates similar to the Maryland and Suffolk County "play or pay" provisions in Fielder and
Suffolk County. That employers have an array of alternatives is
not likely to avoid preemption of measures that impermissibly
mandate benefits and/or interfere with plan administration even if
those alternatives are more attractive than those used by Maryland
and Suffolk County. As the United States Supreme Court emphasized in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, a state law "is not any less of a regulation of the terms of ERISA plans simply because there are two
ways of complying with it ...[particularly where] simple noncompliance with the statute is not one of the options available to plan
administrators."1'5 7 Employers have a strong argument that the
Massachusetts law does more than influence a plan's "shopping decisions" in the way that the New York surcharge statute did in
Travelers since, in Travelers, there was no statutory compulsion to
shop. Rather, the New York law left employers free to stay out of
the health care benefits mall completely. In contrast, "play or pay"
and "fair share" provisions force employers to comply with at least
one statutory option for covering health benefits or paying into a
156. See id. § 188(b), (c)(1O).
157. 532 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2001).
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state fund. By definition, these laws refuse to let employers stay
out of the market and, as such, will probably continue to trigger
relate to preemption as they did in Fielder and Suffolk County.
Another aspect of the Massachusetts Act that raises preemption
concerns is its requirement that employers of eleven or more full or
part time employees offer Internal Revenue Code § 125 "cafeteria
plans" that would enable workers to pay for coverage with pre-tax
dollars while also offering tax benefits to the employer. 1 58 Failure
to do so will result in free rider penalties. To date, the Internal
Revenue Service has taken the position that a § 125 cafeteria plan
does not qualify as an ERISA benefits plan. 159 Although the
agency's ruling would certainly be entitled to heavy deference from
the courts, it does not guarantee that a court would necessarily
agree with this characterization. Still, whether a cafeteria plan is in
and of itself an ERISA plan is not really the point. Even if a cafeteria plan is not an actual benefits plan, requiring its provision
could still amount to a § 514 preempted employer mandate.
Although the design of the Massachusetts Act reflects a conscious attempt to circumvent preemption, the law's chief promoters
and detractors have paid scant attention to potential ERISA
problems-at least publicly. This does not alter the fact that § 514
inevitably casts a shadow over the law's basic premise that employers, like individuals and insurers, must share in the responsibility of
accomplishing universal coverage. The focus on fostering consumer driven competition in insurance markets and the reliance
upon individual mandates make the statute at least appear to be
more ERISA-friendly than its Maryland and Suffolk County predecessors. Yet, its employer provisions remain problematic, especially since in attempting to avoid ERISA preemption, its
architects may have made the Massachusetts law even more vulnerable to attack than its predecessors in Maryland and Suffolk
County.
First, by affecting all employers with eleven or more workers, the
Act may be likely to antagonize far more employers than the WalMarts of the Commonwealth. Second, as examined earlier, the Act
is more elaborate than the Maryland and Suffolk County laws and,
in this way, arguably affects employers far more significantly. Accordingly, it may be more likely to have the kind of "connection"
with a plan so as to impermissibly relate to a plan under § 514. In
(2007); see also
note 57, at 8.
159. See generally 26 U.S.C.A. § 125 (West 2004).

158. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2
CONNECTOR, EMPLOYER HANDBOOK, supra
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this respect, the Commonwealth "Connector" may be a most unfortunate choice of terminology in light of the specter of ERISA
preemption. A third problem results from the requirement of offering "cafeteria plans" to full and part-time workers in order to
avoid paying sizeable portions of uncovered workers' health care
costs as "free rider" penalties. Despite the intended tax benefits
for both employer and employee and the I.R.S.'s position that
§ 125 plans are not ERISA plans, this aspect of the law requires
significant costs and administrative adjustments. Additionally,
paying "free rider" penalties arguably compels an employer to offer a cafeteria plan when it would not otherwise do so. While an
employer's voluntary decision to provide a cafeteria plan might not
implicate ERISA, being compelled to offer one in its benefits package certainly might. Plus, the penalty itself is unlikely to qualify as
a reasonable alternative. As the Fieldercourt recognized, choosing
the cost and negative label of being a free rider is potentially so
pejorative that it is unlikely to be viewed as a reasonable alternative to setting up worker cafeteria plans.
All of these "play or pay" features may be challenged as upsetting Congress' goal of ensuring national uniformity in plan administration. This leads to the fourth and most fundamental problem
for Massachusetts health care reform: some states are already enacting reforms and many more are hoping to learn from the experience of Maryland, Massachusetts, and others in order to craft a
suitable plan for their own citizens. These statutes will continue to
vary in the details, either to suit a particular economy, reflect the
needs of their own population, or simply embrace a different policy
choice. There are many reasons why states should want-and
need-to experiment in this way. Currently, though, they cannot.
As recognized in Fielder and Suffolk County, and more importantly, by the U.S. Supreme Court in Travelers, Egelhoff,160 and on
so many other occasions, uniformity cannot be preserved and,
therefore, ERISA's underlying intent cannot be fulfilled, if employee benefit plans are subject to inconsistent state laws concerning plan administration. Should this new generation of state law be
found to satisfy the relate to clause, it is unlikely to be saved from
preemption as a state insurance regulation. At least in Maryland,
Suffolk County, and Massachusetts, the law targets individuals and
employers, not insurers. Plus, the Massachusetts Act is situated in
the state's tax code and will be enforced as such. Tellingly, neither
160. 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001) (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1,
9 (1987)).
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the Maryland nor Suffolk County Fair Share provisions were even
evaluated for saving clause protection once they were found to fall
within the relate to clause. It seems then that the only way for the
Massachusetts law to remain fully intact is for all employers to voluntarily comply with the Act notwithstanding meritorious § 514 arguments. Since the enactment of this law was marked by an
unusual degree of consensus building, perhaps such teamwork will
endure throughout its implementation.
Or perhaps not. As the first of its kind, the Massachusetts Act
inevitably raises concerns among plan administrators that other
states will follow suit by enacting potentially conflicting or at least
additional requirements that will complicate plan administrationprecisely what ERISA intends to prevent. Any initial impetus to
cooperate is further eroded by the numbers, kinds and varying interests and constraints of affected employers, the financial and administrative costs imposed, and the well grounded fears that those
costs will escalate in the future. The latter concern is especially
troubling since the Act does nothing to contain health care utilization and, with expanded coverage, should drive up utilization and,
therefore, costs.
It should come as no surprise, then, that one week before the
statute's July 1, 2007 effective date, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was pondering an analysis of these issues through a presentation entitled "ERISA Preemption and MA Health Care
Reform. ' ' 161 Thus, in all likelihood, at least some of the law's employer components will be challenged and may fail due to § 514
relate to preemption. Since employers had until January 1, 2008 to
comply with the law, it is too soon to tell whether the possibility of
an ERISA preemption claim will become a reality. Despite the
significant degree of support that the new Massachusetts law enjoyed from the employment sector during its negotiation, passage,
and first eighteen months of implementation, it would seem that at
least some employers will challenge it to discourage more states
from enacting reforms and creating conflicting state directives in
the process. In this regard, future litigants will undoubtedly rely
upon the Fielder court's statement that:
Were we to approve [Maryland's Fair Share law] solely for its
noble purpose, we would be leading a charge against the foundational policy of ERISA, and surely other States and local gov161. The presentation was prepared by Andy R. Anderson of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, a law firm based in Philadelphia, PA., and is available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/AndersonERISAChamber-ofCommerce2ljunO7l.pdf.
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ernments would follow. As sensitive as we are to the right of
Maryland and other States to enact laws of their own choosing,
we are also bound to enforce ERISA as the "supreme Law of
the Land."' 6 2
D.

The Need for ERISA Waivers

It would seem that, if courts see themselves as institutionally incapable of leading the charge to free cash-strapped states from the
binds of ERISA preemption, then Congress must respond. In the
absence of any congressional consensus regarding whether and
how to improve coverage and control costs, it would at least make
sense for Congress to permit state experimentation. Plus, like the
State Children's Health Insurance Program that has proved so successful, allowing states to take the lead in finding the most practical
ways to improve coverage would also fit with Congress's clear preference for acting incrementally, if at all, and for delegating health
law matters-at least politically contentious ones such as these-to
the states.
And this is precisely what is now under review in Congress.
Among the first measures introduced when the Democrats assumed control of the House of Representatives in January 2007
was H.R. 506, the Health Partnership Through Creative Federalism
Act. 1 63 Sponsored by Representatives Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)
and John Tierney (D-MA), it would allow states to apply for ERISA waivers in order to pursue innovative health care reforms
without the threat of ERISA preemption. Hearings took place in
May 2007 during which representatives of the National Business
Coalition on Health and the American Benefits Council, The ERISA Industry Committee, and others were stridently opposed to
liberalizing ERISA waivers.
One attorney, testifying as an advocate for large employers and
the ERISA Industry Committee, identified the following four reasons for preserving strict adherence to ERISA preemption as follows: (1) preemption is needed to permit innovations that will
continue and build upon the success of employer based health care;
(2) Congress carefully considered the effect of ERISA preemption
on state health reform efforts more than 30 years ago, when ER162. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing
U.S. CONST. art. VI).

163. H.R. 506, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). The Act's purpose is "to provide for
innovation in health care through State initiatives that expand coverage and access."

Id.
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ISA was enacted.... [and] concluded that preemption was necessary to eliminate the threat of conflicting state and local regulation
of employee benefit plans"; 164 (3) unlike, Medicaid waivers, for example, granting ERISA waivers would be too complicated since no
waiver approval process currently exists; and (4) "states do not
need ERISA waivers" to accomplish needed reforms since the
problems the reforms address, such as "insuring the unemployed,
providing reliable and accessible information on health care cost
and quality, making affordable insurance available to individuals
and small groups, are outside the scope of ERISA's preemption
provisions."1 6' 5
That an advocate for large employer interests seeks to preserve
preemption comes as no surprise. What is so disturbing, however,
is that the grounds asserted are not just self-interested, but also
inaccurate or at least naive. First, although many employers have
made admirable efforts to bring better coverage to greater numbers at lower costs, this does not mean that they should have freeand sole-reign in deciding how patients and providers are treated
or how the uninsured and state payors are affected. Second, Congress did not consider preemption's impact on "state health care
reform" when it passed ERISA. That is the key problem at the
heart of thirty-five years of ERISA jurisprudence concerning both
conflict and complete preemption. In enacting ERISA, Congress
was clearly focused on pension plan reform and paid little attention
to the full ramifications of preemption on health care finance and
delivery issues in an age of managed care which were virtually nonexistent in the early 1980s. That the federal HMO Act contemporaneously had to require employers to offer HMO plans is just one
of many indicia that current issues of cost, coverage, and quality
were simply not on the congressional radar during the debate and
passage of ERISA.1 6 6
Third, arguing that waivers are too complicated because there is
no system in place is akin to arguing in the 1930s that income taxes
simply could not be levied since there was no system in place yet.
The idea simply makes no sense, especially with the Medicaid
164. Health Care Reform: Recommendations to Improve Coordination of Federal
and State Initiatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor,
and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Amy N. Moore, Covington & Burling LLP), available
at http://edworkforce.house.gov/testimony/052207AmyMooreTestimony.pdf.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1996).
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waiver program as a ready analogue to put an ERISA waiver process in place.
Fourth, the problems of improving quality and expanding coverage which are described as "outside the scope" of ERISA preemption have ironically been placed within that scope by large
employers seeking to defeat such state health care reforms. Thirty
years of legislative and judicial experience shows that ERISA has
been a huge obstacle to everyone but employers, i.e., patients,
providers, and states alike. In this regard, congressional hearings
on the advisability of expanding ERISA waivers also heard from
state officials from Montana, Maryland, and New Jersey who described the many and varied reform initiatives that have been
blocked by ERISA preemption, particularly with respect to self167
funded plans.
Some may see ERISA waivers as the most that can be hoped for
from a Congress that has been so reluctant to tackle wide scale
health reform. Perhaps, though, waivers are the ideal next step.
Allowing state experimentation may offer the best promise for figuring out how to fix the health care system since it is broken in so
many places and in so many ways. As explained by Montana's Insurance Commissioner, health care reform measures that hold
great promise in Massachusetts may not fit the economy or geography of Montana. Thus, state by state solutions may be necessary
precursors to a rational plan.1 68 If nothing else, the Massachusetts
Act deserves a chance to succeed or fail on its own merits. Its use
of an array of methods for expanding and financing coverage has
never been put into practice. Its reliance on aggressive outreach
and consensus building has been a textbook example of how to
design and implement comprehensive statutory reform. Without
ERISA preemption, it might still stumble, but even if it did, there
are so many valuable lessons to be learned by all states attempting
reform. If Congress will not undertake meaningful health care reform, it should at least get out of the way of states like Massachusetts that have invested the time and resources into figuring out
how to try.
167. See Hearing, supra note 164 (statements of Montana Auditor and Commissioner of Insurance and Securities, Maryland Secretary of Health and Human Hygiene, and New Jersey Commissioner of Banking and Insurance), available at http://
edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/help052207.shtml.
168. See Hearing, supra note 164 (statement of John Morrison, Montana Auditor
and Commissioner of Insurance and Securities), available at http://edworkforce.
house.gov/testimony/052207JohnMorrisonTestimony.pdf.
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CONCLUSION

The ability of state actors and civic organizations to find common ground on a variety of difficult issues has been one of the
hallmarks of Massachusetts' far reaching state health care initiative. From the earliest stages of the legislative process, the Commonwealth has displayed a remarkable level of political
sophistication and leadership by skillfully addressing private and
public interests in attacking the state's health care crisis. Its innovation and tenacity in pursing universal coverage shows that socially conscious, market-based solutions are both necessary and
possible. In the increasingly polarized arena of national politics,
Massachusetts is also demonstrating that solutions to the thorniest
economic and political dilemmas can be reached when both the
government and private sector work together.
Undoubtedly, the Massachusetts plan will face significant and
ongoing challenges in maintaining affordability standards and quality coverage. The coming years will most likely witness numerous
setbacks as anticipated and unexpected problems arise. Among
other things, significant time and resources must be-and so far
have been-focused on generating public awareness about the
law's benefits and requirements. The Commonwealth should also
begin to sensitize employers and employees alike to the fact that
long-term sustainability may require tax increases or continued reallocation of public resources. Despite these and many more challenges, Massachusetts has remained true to its maverick reputation
in taking the lead by launching such a promising reform process
with important national implications. Whether other states adopt,
borrow from, or dismiss the Massachusetts model, there is no question that the Massachusetts experience will yield important lessons
for health care reform at the state and national level.
All of this may be curtailed, however, should the Act be eroded
by ERISA preemption. The first few months since the Act took
effect have been remarkably quiet in this respect. Public discourse
has focused on conducting an aggressive outreach plan to boost
enrollments.169 Media coverage has focused on the plan's longterm affordability for individuals and employers, and on overall
sustainability. 170 Perhaps, then, Massachusetts health care reform
will evade ERISA preemption because employers, along with
169. See, e.g., Dembner, supra note 49; Jeffrey Krasner, Penalties to Rise for ShunGLOBE, Jan. 1, 2008, at 1A.
170. See Dembner, supra note 49.
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other stakeholders, understand that the time has come to take this
on and make it work. Should ERISA preemption reveal that this is
just a transient honeymoon for state health care reform, all fifty
states will be thrown back to square one. Since the Massachusetts
plan tries just about everything, its preemption under ERISA § 514
would mean unfettered climbing costs, widening coverage gaps,
and mounting public frustration. This in turn would unequivocally
reveal that the health care crisis will remain "same as it ever
was," 17 1 putting states in a bind that can only be untied by the talk-

ing heads of Congress.
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